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Abstract. Gossip protocols aim at arriving, by means of point-to-point
or group communications, at a situation in which all the agents know
each other secrets, see, e.g., [11]. In [1], building upon [3], we studied dis-
tributed epistemic gossip protocols, which are examples of knowledge
based programs introduced in [6]. These protocols use as guards for-
mulas from a simple epistemic logic. We show here that these protocols
are implementable by proving that it is decidable to determine whether
a formula with no nested modalities is true after a sequence of calls.
Building upon this result we further show that the problems of partial
correctness and of termination of such protocols are decidable, as well.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
Knowledge-based programs were introduced in [6]—these are programs that
use tests for knowledge. Examples are protocols for the sequence transmission
problem, such as the alternating bit protocol, studied in [7]. A more recent
example are the distributed epistemic gossip protocols introduced in [3] and
further studied in a slightly different setting in [1].
In gossip protocols each agent holds a secret initially known only to him.
The secrets spread by means of communications. During them, e.g., point-to-
point or group communications, the participating agents exchange all secrets
they know. The aim of the gossip protocols is to arrive at a situation in which
all the agents know each other secrets, see, e.g., the early survey [8], the book
coverage [10] or a more recent paper [11].
As shown in [1], the formulation of distributed gossip protocols as knowledge-
based programs considerably simplifies the task of their verification. The reason
is that these protocols are strikingly simple in their syntax based on epistemic
logic (though not semantics)—they are just parallel compositions of loops in
which the agents repeatedly perform a call assuming the corresponding epistemic
guard evaluates to true. One issue ignored in [1] was the natural question: are
these gossip protocols implementable?
In this paper we provide a positive answer to this question. More precisely,
we show that it is decidable to determine whether a formula with no nested
modalities is true after a sequence of calls. All gossip protocols studied in [3] use
only such formulas as guards.
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We also study correctness and termination of these protocols. Building upon
the just mentioned result we show that it is decidable to determine whether a
given distributed epistemic gossip protocol is correct. Namely, the formula that
expresses its correctness is with no nested modalities and we show that for such
formulas truth is decidable. The final result allows us to solve the halting problem
for these protocols. This shows that the distributed epistemic gossip protocols
are very specific programs that in particular do not have the full power of the
Turing machines.
The obtained results, while sufficient for a study of the considered protocols,
do not address more general questions concerning both the logic itself and the
protocols, which remain open and to which we return in the conclusions.
Finally, let us mention here some recent works on gossip protocols. In [2] a
tool is presented that given a high level description of an epistemic protocol in the
setting of [3] generates the characteristics of the protocol. The calls considered
there differ from ours, so this approach is not applicable to our setting. Further,
[13] presents a study of dynamic distributed gossip protocols in which the calls
allow the agents not only to share the secrets but also to transmit the links. The
purpose of the paper is to characterize such protocols in terms of the class of
graphs for which they terminate. Such protocols then differ from the ones here
considered, which are static. Next, in [9] gossip protocols are studied that aim
at achieving higher-order shared knowledge. Finally, in [4] gossip protocols are
studied as an instance of multi-agent epistemic planning that is subsequently
translated into the classical planning language PDDL.
1.2 Plan
The paper is organized as follows. In the next two sections we recall the syntax
and semantics introduced in [1]. Then, in Sect. 4 we introduce an alternative,
equivalent, semantics, which helps us to prove the desired decidability results.
In Sect. 5 we prove the decidability of checking whether a formula with no nested
modalities is true after a given sequence of calls, and in Sect. 6 we show how to
extend this result to checking whether such a formula is true (so true after
any sequence of calls). In turn, in Sect. 7 we show that it is also decidable to
determine whether a given gossip protocol terminates. Then, in the final section,
we list some related open problems and clarify the difference between the type
of calls studied in [1,3].
2 Syntax
Throughout the paper we assume a fixed finite set A of at least three agents.
We assume that each agent holds exactly one secret and that there exists a
bijection between the set of agents and the set of secrets. We denote by P the
set of all secrets. Our aim is to analyze what the agents know after a sequence
of calls took place. So first we introduce the calls and then consider an epistemic
language allowing us to refer to agents’ knowledge.
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Assume a fixed ordering on the agents. Each call concerns two different
agents, say a and b, and is written as ab, where agent a precedes agent b in the
assumed ordering.
Calls are denoted by c, d. Abusing notation we write a ∈ c to denote that
agent a is one of the two agents involved in the call c (e.g., for c := ab we have
a ∈ c and b ∈ c).
We consider formulas in a simple epistemic language defined by the following
grammar:
φ ::= Fap | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | Kaφ,
where p ∈ P and a ∈ A. Each secret is viewed a distinct constant. We denote the
secret of agent a by A, the secret of agent b by B and so on. We denote the set
of so defined formulas by L and we refer to its members as epistemic formulas.
We read Fap as ‘agent a is familiar with the secret p’ and Kaφ as ‘agent
a knows that formula φ is true’. So Fap is an atomic formula, while Kaφ is a
compound formula. In fact, all atomic formulas of L are of the form Fap.
In [1], as a follow up on [3], we also introduced distributed epistemic gossip
protocols. We do not discuss them here and only mention that formulas of L
are used in them as guards. All guards used in [1] are built from the formulas
FaB and KaFbC, where a and b are different agents, by means of the Boolean
connectives. Thus no nested modalities are used in the guards.
3 Semantics
We now recall from [1] semantics of the epistemic formulas. To this end we recall
first the concept of a gossip situation.
3.1 Gossip Situations and Their Modifications
A gossip situation (in short a situation) is a sequence s = (Qa)a∈A, where
Qa⊆P for each agent a. Intuitively, Qa is the set of secrets a is familiar with in
situation s. The initial gossip situation is the one in which each Qa equals
{A} and is denoted by root. We say that an agent a is an expert in a situation
s if he is familiar in s with all the secrets, i.e., if Qa = P. The initial gossip
situation reflects the fact that initially each agent is familiar only with his own
secret.
In this paper we do not study particular gossip protocols. We mention only
that their goal is to reach a gossip situation in which each agent is an expert.
We will use the following concise notation for gossip situations. Sets of secrets
will be written down as lists. e.g., the set {A,B,C} will be written as ABC.
Gossip situations will be written down as lists of lists of secrets separated by
dots. E.g., if there are three agents, then root = A.B.C and the gossip situation
({A,B}, {A,B}, {C}) will be written as AB.AB.C.
Each call transforms the current gossip situation by modifying the set of
secrets the agents involved in the call are familiar with. Consider a gossip situa-
tion s := (Qd)d∈A. Then ab(s) := (Q′d)d∈A, where Q
′
a = Q
′
b = Qa ∪ Qb, Q′c = Qc,
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for c = a, b. This simply says that the only effect of a call is that the secrets are
shared between the two agents involved in it.
3.2 Call Sequences
In [1] computations of the gossip protocols were studied, so both finite and infi-
nite call sequences were used. Here we limit ourselves to the finite call sequences
as we are only interested in the semantics of epistemic formulas.
So in this paper, in contrast to [1], a call sequence is a finite sequence of
calls. The empty sequence is denoted by . We use c to denote a call sequence
and C to denote the set of all call sequences. Given call sequences c and d and
a call c we denote by c.c the outcome of adding c at the end of the sequence c
and by c.d the outcome of appending the sequences c and d. We write c  d to
denote the fact that d extends c, i.e., that for some c′ we have c.c′ = d.
The result of applying a call sequence to a situation s is defined inductively
as follows:
[Base] (s) := s,
[Step] (c.c)(s) := c(c(s)).
Example 1. Let A = {a, b, c}. Consider the call sequence (ac, bc, ac). It generates
the following successive gossip situations starting from root:
A.B.C
ac−→ AC.B.AC bc−→ AC.ABC.ABC ac−→ ABC.ABC.ABC.
Hence (ac, bc, ac)(root) = (ABC.ABC.ABC). 	unionsq
3.3 Gossip Models and Truth
A gossip situation is a set of possible combinations of secret distributions among
the agents. As calls progress in sequence from the initial situation, agents may
be uncertain about which one of such secrets distributions is the actual one.
This uncertainty is captured by appropriate equivalence relations on the call
sequences.
Definition 1. A gossip model is a tuple M := (C, {∼a}a∈A), where each
∼a⊆ C × C is defined inductively as follows.
[Base]  ∼a ;
[Step] Suppose c ∼a d.
(i) If a ∈ c, then c.c ∼a d and c ∼a d.c.
(ii) If a ∈ c and c.c(root)a = d.c(root)a, then c.c ∼a d.c.
A gossip model with a designated call sequence is called a pointed gossip
model.
For instance, by (i) we have ab, bc ∼a ab, bd. But we do not have bc, ab ∼a
bd, ab since (bc, ab)(root)a = ABC = ABD = (bd, ab)(root)a.
We recall now from [1] the following two properties of ∼a.
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Fact 1
(i) Each ∼a is an equivalence relation;
(ii) For all c,d ∈ C if c ∼a d, then c(root)a = d(root)a.
Finally, we recall the definition of truth.
Definition 2. Let (M, c) be a pointed gossip model with M := (C, (∼a)a∈A)
and c ∈ C. We define the satisfaction relation |= inductively as follows (clauses
for Boolean connectives are as usual and omitted):
(M, c) |= Fap iff p ∈ c(root)a,
(M, c) |= Kaφ iff ∀d s.t. c ∼a d, (M,d) |= φ.
Further
M |= φ iff ∀c (M, c) |= φ.
When M |= φ we say that φ is true. 	unionsq
So formula Fap is true whenever secret p belongs to the set of secrets agent a is
familiar with in the situation generated by the designated call sequence c applied
to the initial situation root. The knowledge operator is interpreted as customary
in epistemic logic using the equivalence relations ∼a.
4 An Alternative Equivalence Relation
In this section we provide an alternative equivalence relation between the call
sequences that is easier to work with. To this end we introduce a view of agent
a of a call sequence c, written as ca, and defined by induction as follows.
[Base]
a := root,
[Step]
(c.c)a :=
{
ca
c−→ s if a ∈ c
ca otherwise
where for d ∈ A
sd :=
{
c.c(root)d if d ∈ c
s′d otherwise
where s′ is the last gossip situation in ca.
Intuitively, a view of agent a of a call sequence c is the information he acquires
by means of the calls in c he is involved in. It consists of a sequence of gossip
situations connected by the calls in which a is involved in. After each such call,
say ab, agent a updates the set of gossips he and b are currently familiar with.
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Example 2. Let us return to Example 1. So A = {a, b, c} and we consider the call
sequence (ac, bc, ac). We noticed there that it generates the following successive
gossip situations starting from root:
A.B.C
ac−→ AC.B.AC bc−→ AC.ABC.ABC ac−→ ABC.ABC.ABC.
Wenow compare it with the view of agent a of the sequence (ac, bc, ac), which is
A.B.C
ac−→ AC.B.AC ac−→ ABC.B.ABC.
Thus, in the final gossip situation of this view, agent b is familiar with neither
the secret A nor C. However, the final gossip situation of a view does not reflect
agents’ knowledge. In fact, as we shall see, according to the semantics, after
the above sequence of calls, agent a knows that agent b is familiar both with A
and C. 	unionsq
We now introduce for each agent a an equivalence relation ≡a between the
call sequences, defined as follows:
c ≡a d iff ca = da.
So according to this definition two call sequences are equivalent for agent a if
his views of them are the same. The following result shows that the equivalence
relations ∼a and ≡a coincide.
Theorem 2 (Equivalence). For each agent a the relations ∼a and ≡a coincide.
Proof. Omitted. 	unionsq
So two call sequences are ∼a equivalent iff their views by agent a coincide.
This alternative definition of the equivalence relation between the call sequences
makes it simpler to determine various properties of our semantics.
Below, given a call c, we denote by c∗ a sequence consisting of zero or more
calls c and by c+ a sequence consisting of one or more calls c.
Example 3. Note that we have (M, (ac, bc, ac)) |= KaFbA. To see this recall
from Example 2 that the view of agent a of the sequence (ac, bc, ac) is
A.B.C
ac−→ AC.B.AC ac−→ ABC.B.ABC.
So if (ac, bc, ac) ≡a d, then d is of the form ac, (bc)+, ac, (bc)∗, which implies
that (M,d) |= FbA.
We conclude that it is possible that an agent, here a, knows that another
agent, here b, is familiar with his (so a’s) secret even though no communication
took place between them. The same argument shows that (M, (ac, bc, ac)) |=
KaFbC, as claimed in Example 2. 	unionsq
In the examples and proofs below we use the ≡a relation instead of ∼a
and repeatedly appeal to the Equivalence Theorem2. First we show that an
immediate repetition of a call has no effect on the truth of the formulas. More
precisely, the following holds.
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Theorem 3 (Stuttering). Suppose that c := c1, c, c2 and d := c1, c, c, c2.
Then for all formulas φ, (M, c) |= φ iff (M,d) |= φ.
Proof. We proceed by induction of the structure of φ. For the formulas of the
form Fap it suffices to note that c(root) = d(root). The only induction step of
interest is for the formulas of the form Kaφ. Suppose first that a ∈ c. Then
c ≡a d, so (M, c) |= Kaφ iff (M,d) |= Kaφ.
Assume now that a ∈ c. Suppose that (M, c) |= Kaφ. Take d′ such that
d ≡a d′. Then d′ is of the form d′1, c, c,d′2. Let c′ := d′1, c,d′2. By the induction
hypothesis (M,d′) |= φ iff (M, c′) |= φ. Further, d ≡a d′ implies that c ≡a c′.
So (M, c′) |= φ. Hence (M,d′) |= φ and consequently (M,d) |= Kaφ.
The proof in the other direction is analogous. 	unionsq
The above result cannot be extended to a repetition of the call sequences.
Indeed, we have (M, (ab, bc)) |= ¬FaC, and (M, (ab, bc, ab, bc)) |= FaC. On
the other hand a monotonicity result holds for positive formulas.
Theorem 4 (Monotonicity). Suppose that φ is a formula that does not con-
tain the ¬ symbol. Then
c  d and (M, c) |= φ implies (M,d) |= φ.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of φ. The only case of interest
is when φ is of the form Kaψ. Suppose that c  d and (M, c) |= φ. Take some
call sequence d′ such that d ≡a d′. Then for some call sequences d1 and d′1 such
that d1,d′1 = d
′ we have c ≡a d1.
We have by the assumption (M,d1) |= ψ, so by the induction hypothesis
(M,d′) |= ψ. As d′ was arbitrarily chosen we conclude that (M,d) |= φ. 	unionsq
Here and below we say that a call is a b-call if agent b is involved in it. Before
we deal with the decidability matters consider the formula KaFbC for pairwise
different agents a, b, c. The following example reveals that it can be true in some
subtle ways.
Example 4
(i) First, note that a can learn (that is, know) that agent b is familiar with the
secret C through a direct communication with b.
Indeed, we have (M, (bc, ab)) |= KaFbC. Namely the view of agent a of the
sequence (bc, ab) is
A.B.C
ab−→ ABC.ABC.C.
So if (bc, ab) ≡a d, then d is of the form (bc)+, ab, (bc)∗, which implies that
(M,d) |= FbC.
(ii) Further, it is also possible that a learns that b is familiar with the secret C
through a direct communication with c.
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Indeed, we have (M, (bc, ac)) |= KaFbC. To see this note that the view of
agent a of the sequence (bc, ac) is
A.B.C
ac−→ ABC.B.ABC.
So if (bc, ac) ≡a d, then d is of the form (bc)+, ac, (bc)∗, which implies that
(M,d) |= FbC.
(iii) Also, it is possible that a learns that b is familiar with the secret C without
ever communicating with b or c.
Namely, we have (M, (cd, ad, bd, ad)) |= KaFbC. Indeed, the view of agent a
of the sequence (cd, ad, bd, ad) is
A.B.C.D
ad−→ ACD.B.C.ACD ad−→ ABCD.B.C.ABCD.
So if (cd, ad, bd, ad) ≡a d, then d is of the form (cd)+, (bc)∗, ad,d′, ad,d′′,
where in d′ a call bd took place or a call bc followed by a call cd took place,
and in d′ and d′′ no a-call took place. This implies that (M,d) |= FbC.
(iv) In (iii) agent a learned that b is familiar with c by communicating with
agent d twice. But it is also possible that a learns that b is familiar with the
secret C without communicating with any agent twice.
To see this note that (M, (cd, ad, bc, ac)) |= KaFbC. Indeed, the view of
agent a of the sequence (cd, ad, bc, ac) is
A.B.C.D
ad−→ ACD.B.C.ACD ac−→ ABCD.B.ABCD.ACD.
So if (cd, ad, bc, ac) ≡a d, then d is of the form (cd)+, ad,d′, ac,d′′, where in d′
a call bc took place or a call bd followed by a call cd took place, and in d′ and
d′′ no a-call took place. This implies that (M,d) |= FbC. 	unionsq
We conclude by noting that the Monotonicity Theorem4 does not hold when
we extend the call sequences to the left. Indeed, as observed in Example 4
(ii), (M, (bc, ac)) |= KaFbC. However, (M, (cd, bc, ac)) |= ¬KaFbC, since
(cd, bc, ac) ≡a (bd, cd, ac) and (M, (bd, cd, ac)) |= ¬FbC.
5 Decidability of Semantics
In this section we show that the definition of semantics given in Definition 2 is
decidable for formulas that do not use nested modalities.
Consider a call sequence c. If for some prefix c1.c of c, c1(root) = c1.c(root),
then we say that c is redundant in c. First note the following observation.
Lemma 1 (Semantic Stuttering). Suppose that c := c1, c, c2 and d := c1, c2,
where c is redundant in c. Then for all propositional formulas φ, (M, c) |= φ
iff (M,d) |= φ.
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Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of φ. The only case of interest
is when φ is of the form Fap. The redundancy of c implies that c(root) = d(root).
Hence (M, c) |= Fap iff p ∈ c(root)a iff p ∈ d(root)a iff (M,d) |= Fap. 	unionsq
The following example shows that Lemma 1 does not extend to arbitrary
formulas of L.
Example 5. In the call sequence ab, ac, bc, ab the second call ab is redundant since
(ab, ac, bc, ab)(root) = (ab, ac, bc)(root) = ABC.ABC.ABC.
However, (M, (ab, ac, bc, ab)) |= KaFbC, because if d ≡a (ab, ac, bc, ab) then
d is of the form (ab, ac, bc+, ab, bc∗). At the same time, (M, (ab, ac, bc)) |=
¬KaFbC since (ab, ac, bc) ≡a (ab, ac). 	unionsq
Now, consider an agent a and a call sequence c. Starting from c we repeatedly
remove from the current call sequence a redundant call that does not involve
agent a. We call each outcome of such an iteration an a-reduction of c.
Corollary 1. Let d be an a-reduction of c. Then
(i) c ≡a d,
(ii) for all propositional formulas φ, (M, c) |= φ iff (M,d) |= φ.
Proof
(i) It suffices to note that a removal of a redundant call that does not involve
agent a does not affect his view of the call sequence.
(ii) By the repeated use of the Semantic Stuttering Lemma1. 	unionsq
Given an agent a we now say that a call sequence c is a-redundant free if
no call c from c such that a ∈ c is redundant in it. Clearly each a-reduction is
a-redundant free.
We now prove the following crucial lemma.
Lemma 2. For each agent a and a call sequence c the set of a-redundant free
call sequences d such that c ≡a d is finite.
Proof. Consider an a-redundant free call sequence d such that c ≡a d. Then d
has the same number, say k, of a-calls as c.
Associate with d the sequence of gossip situations d0(root),d1(root), ...,
dm(root), where m is the length of d, d0 = , and dk = d1, d2, . . . , dk for
k = 1, . . . ,m. This sequence monotonically grows, where we interpret the inclu-
sion relation component wise. Moreover, for all calls di such that a ∈ di the
corresponding inclusion is strict. Consequently, m, the length of d, is bounded
by k + |A|2, the sum of the number of a-calls in c and of the total number of
secrets in the gossip situation in which each agent is an expert.
But for each m there are only finitely many call sequences of length at most m.
This concludes the proof. 	unionsq
We can now state and prove the desired result.
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Theorem 5 (Decidability of Semantics). For each call sequence c it is
decidable whether for a formula φ with no nested modalities (M, c) |= φ holds.
Proof. We use the definition of semantics as the algorithm. We only need to
show that the case of the formulas of the form Kaφ, where φ is a propositional
formula, can be rewritten by referring to a finite set of call sequences d that can
be explicitly constructed. Thanks to the Equivalence Theorem2 and Corollary 1
we can rewrite the clause for Kaφ as:
(M, c) |= Kaφ iff ∀d s.t. c ∼a d and d is a-redundant free, (M,d) |= φ,
and according to Lemma2 this definition indeed refers to an explicitly con-
structed finite set of call sequences d. 	unionsq
6 Decidability of Truth
Next, we show that truth for formulas that do not use nested modalities is
decidable. This implies that the verification problem of gossip protocols, i.e.,
the problem of determining whether upon protocol’s termination every agent is
an expert, is decidable for protocols that do not use nested modalities. These
include all protocols discussed in [1].
The key notion in our approach is that of an epistemic view . It is a function
of a call sequence c, denoted by EV (c), defined by
– putting for each agent a ∈ A, EV (c)(a) = {d(root) | c ∼a d}, and setting
– EV (c)(∗) = c(root).
So EV (c)(a) is the set of all gossip situations consistent with agent a’s obser-
vations made throughout c and EV (c)(∗) is the actual gossip situation after c
takes place. Note that if c ∼a d then EV (c)(a) = EV (d)(a).
Lemma 3. For each call sequence c and agent a the set EV (c)(a) is finite and
can be effectively constructed.
Proof. Fix an agent a. By Corollary 1, Equivalence Theorem2, and Fact 1(ii) to
construct the set EV (c)(a) it suffices to consider a-redundant free call sequences
d and by Lemma2 there are only finitely many such call sequences d for which
d ∼a c. 	unionsq
Our interest in epistemic views stems from the following result.
Lemma 4. Suppose that EV (c) = EV (d). Then for all epistemic formulas with
no nested modalities φ, (M, c) |= φ iff (M,d) |= φ.
Proof. A simple proof by induction shows that for a propositional formula ψ and
arbitrary call sequences c′ and d′, c′(root) = d′(root) implies that (M, c′) |= ψ
iff (M,d′) |= ψ. Since EV (c)(∗) = c(root) and EV (d)(∗) = d(root), this settles
the case for φ = Fap.
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The above observation also implies that for a propositional formula ψ and
an agent a,
(M, c) |= Kaψ iff ∀c′ s.t. c′(root) ∈ EV (c)(a), (M, c′) |= ψ.
Since EV (c)(a) = EV (d)(a), this settles the case for φ = Kaψ.
The remaining cases of negation and conjunction follow directly by the
induction. 	unionsq
The above lemma is useful because the set of epistemic views is finite, in
contrast to the set of call sequences. Next, we provide an inductive definition of
EV (c.c)(a) the importance of which will become clear in a moment.
Lemma 5. For any call sequence c, call c, and agent a such that a ∈ c
EV (c.c)(a) = {c(s) | s ∈ EV (c)(a) and c(s)a = c(c(root))a}.
Proof. Intuitively the condition c(s)a = c(c(root))a states that s is consistent
with the observation agent a gets after call c is made in the gossip situation
c(root).
(⊆) Take s′ ∈ EV (c.c)(a). By the definition of EV (c.c)(a) there exists a call
sequence d.c such that d.c ∼a c.c and s′ = d.c(root). So s′ = c(s), where s =
d(root). We also have d ∼a c, so d(root) ∈ EV (c)(a). Moreover, c(d(root))a =
c(c(root))a, because d.c ∼a c.c.
(⊇) Take s′ ∈ {c(s) | s ∈ EV (c)(a) and c(s)a = c(c(root))a}. So for some gossip
situation s we have s′ = c(s), s ∈ EV (c)(a) and c(s)a = c(c(root))a. The second
fact implies that there exists a call sequence d such that d ∼a c and s = d(root).
Now, this and the third fact imply that d.c ∼a c.c. So d.c(root) ∈ EV (c.c)(a).
Consequently also s′ ∈ EV (c.c)(a), since s′ = c(s) = d.c(root). 	unionsq
This brings us to the following important conclusion stating that EV (c.c)
can be computed using EV (c) and c only, i.e., without referring to c. Denote the
set of epistemic views by E˜V and recall that C denotes the set of calls.
Corollary 2. There exists a function f : E˜V × C → E˜V such that for any call
sequence c and call c
EV (c.c)(a) = f(EV (c), c).
Proof. By the definition of ∼a we have EV (c.c)(a) = EV (c)(a) if a ∈ c,
EV (c.c)(∗) = c(EV (c)(∗)). This in conjunction with the above lemma implies
the claim. 	unionsq
Consider a call sequence c. If for some prefix c1.c2 of c, we have EV (c1) =
EV (c1.c2), then we say that the call subsequence c2 is epistemically redun-
dant in c and that c is epistemically redundant .
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We say that c is epistemically non-redundant if it is not epistemi-
cally redundant. Equivalently, a call sequence c1.c2. . . . .ck is epistemically non-
redundant if the set
{EV (c1.c2. . . . .ci) | i ∈ {1, . . . , k}}
has k elements.
We now show a counterpart of the Semantic Stuttering Lemma1 for epistemic
views.
Lemma 6 (Epistemic Stuttering). Suppose that c := c1.c2.c3 and d := c1.
c3, where c2 is epistemically redundant in c. Then EV (c) = EV (d).
Proof. Let c3 = c1.c2. . . . .ck. First note that thanks to Corollary 2 we
have EV (c1.c2.c1) = EV (c1.c1), since EV (c1.c2.c1) = f(EV (c1.c2), c1) =
f(EV (c1), c1) = EV (c1.c1) due to the epistemic redundancy of c2 in c. Repeat-
ing this argument for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} we get that EV (c1.c2.c1.c2. . . . .ci) =
EV (c1.c1.c2. . . . .ci).
In particular EV (c) = EV (d). 	unionsq
Corollary 3. For every call sequence c there exists an epistemically non-
redundant call sequence d such that for all epistemic formulas with no nested
modalities φ, (M, c) |= φ iff (M,d) |= φ.
Proof. By the repeated use of the Epistemic Stuttering Lemmas 4 and 6. 	unionsq
Next, we prove the following crucial lemma.
Lemma 7. For any given model M, there are only finitely many epistemically
non-redundant call sequences.
Proof. Note that each epistemic view is a function from A ∪ {∗} to the set
of functions from A to 2|P| (this is an overestimation because for ∗ this set
has only one element). There are k = 2(|A|+1)·2
|A|·|P|
such functions, so any call
sequence longer than k has an epistemically redundant call subsequence. But
there are only finitely many call sequences of length at most k. This concludes the
proof. 	unionsq
Finally, we can establish the announced result.
Theorem 6 (Decidability of Truth). For any formula φ with no nested
modalities, it is decidable whether M |= φ holds.
Proof. Recall that M |= φ iff ∀c (M, c) |= φ. Thanks to Corollary 3 we can
rewrite the latter as
∀c s.t. c is epistemically non-redundant, (M, c) |= φ.
But according to Lemma7 there are only finitely many epistemically non-
redundant call sequences and by Lemma3 their set can be explicitly
constructed. 	unionsq
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As an easy consequence we obtain the following.
Corollary 4. It is decidable to determine whether a given gossip situation can
be an outcome of a call sequence.
Proof. Each gossip situation s = (Qd)d∈A can be encoded as a conjunction
φ(s) =
∧
a∈A
( ∧
B∈Qa
FaB ∧
∧
B ∈Qa
¬FaB
)
.
Then ∃c(c(root) = s) iff ∃c((M, c) |= φ(s)) iff ¬(M |= ¬φ(s)). 	unionsq
7 Decidability of Termination
Finally, we show that it is decidable to determine whether a gossip protocol
terminates. First, we establish monotonicity of gossip situations and epistemic
views with respect to call sequence extensions. Intuitively, we claim that as the
call sequence gets longer each agent acquires more information. This can be
seen as a counterpart of the Monotonicity Theorem4. First we need to define
suitable partial orderings ≤s and ≤ev over gossip situations and epistemic views,
respectively.
Definition 3. For any two gossip situations s, s′ we write s ≤s s′ if for all a ∈ A
we have sa ⊆ s′a.
Note 1. For all call sequences c and d such that c  d we have c(root) ≤s d(root).
Proof. For any gossip situation s and call c we have by definition s ≤s c(s). By
induction this implies that for any call sequence c′ we have s ≤s c′(s). Now c  d
implies that d = c.c′ for some c′. Therefore, c(root) ≤s c′(c(root)) = d(root). 	unionsq
Definition 4. For any two epistemic views V, V ′ ∈ E˜V we write V ≤ev V ′ if for
all a ∈ A there exists X ⊆ V (a) and an surjective (onto) function g : X → V ′(a)
such that for all s ∈ X we have s ≤s g(s).
Lemma 8. ≤ev is a partial order.
Proof. Omitted. 	unionsq
The next lemma formalizes the intuition that epistemic information grows
along a call sequence.
Lemma 9. For all two call sequences such that c  d we have EV (c) ≤ev EV (d).
Proof. Let d = c.c′. Take a ∈ A. Note that by a repeated application of Lemma5
we can show that EV (c.c′)(a) = {c′(s) | s ∈ EV (c)(a) and ∀c′′c′ c′′(s)a =
c′′(c(root))a}. It suffices then to pick X = {s ∈ EV (c)(a) | ∀c′′c′ c′′(s)a =
c′′(c(root))a}, and set g(s) = c′(s) for all s ∈ X. It is easy to check that such
g : X → EV (d) is surjective, so EV (c) ≤ev EV (d). 	unionsq
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We can now draw the following useful conclusion.
Lemma 10. Suppose that c is epistemically redundant. Then a prefix c1.c of it
exists such that c1 is epistemically non-redundant and EV (c1.c) = EV (c1).
Proof. Let c1.c2 be the shortest prefix of c such that EV (c1) = EV (c1.c2).
Then c1 is epistemically non-redundant. Let c2 = c1. . . . .cl. By Lemma9 we
have EV (c1) ≤s EV (c1.c1) ≤s EV (c1.c1.c2) ≤s . . . ≤s EV (c1.c1.c2. . . . .cl) =
EV (c1.c2) = EV (c1). Since ≤s is a partial order, EV (c1.c1) = EV (c1) holds. 	unionsq
Finally we can establish the desired result.
Theorem 7 (Decidability of Termination). Given a gossip protocol it is
decidable to determine whether it always terminates.
Proof. We first prove that a gossip protocol may fail to terminate iff it can
generate a call sequence c.c such that c is epistemically non-redundant and
EV (c.c) = EV (c).
(⇒) Let c be an infinite sequence of calls generated by the protocol. There
are only finitely many epistemic views, so some prefix c of c is epistemically
redundant. The claim now follows by Lemma10.
(⇐) Suppose that the protocol generates a sequence of calls c.c such that c is
epistemically non-redundant and EV (c.c) = EV (c).
Let φ be the guard associated with the call c. By assumption (M, c) |= φ.
By the assumption about the gossip protocols the formula φ is without nested
modalities, so by Lemma4 (M, c.c) |= φ. Hence by the repeated use of the
Stuttering Theorem3, for all i ≥ 1, (M, c.ci) |= φ. Consequently, c.cω is an
infinite sequence of calls that can be generated by the protocol.
The above equivalence shows that determining whether the protocol always
terminates is equivalent to checking that it cannot generate a call sequence c.c
such that c is epistemically non-redundant and EV (c.c) = EV (c).
But given a call sequence, by the Decidability of Semantics Theorem5, it
is decidable to determine whether it can be generated by the protocol and by
Lemma3 it is decidable to determine whether a call sequence is epistemically
non-redundant. Further, by Lemma7 there are only finitely many epistemically
non-redundant call sequences, so the claim follows. 	unionsq
8 Conclusions
In this paper we studied decidability questions concerning a natural epistemic
logic appropriate for expressing gossip protocols. One of our aims was to show that
the gossip protocols considered in [1] are executable. A self-contained summary is
that the semantics of the introduced epistemic language L is decidable for formu-
las with no nested modalities. Another aim was to prove that partial correctness
of the gossip protocols studied in [1] is decidable. To this end we showed that truth
of formulas of L with no nested modalities is decidable. This implies the former
32 K.R. Apt and D. Wojtczak
since partial correctness of such a gossip protocol means that a specific epistemic
formula, namely the conjunction of the negation of all guards implies that each
agent is an expert, is true and such a formula has no nested modalities. Finally,
we showed the problem of determining termination of a gossip protocol is decid-
able. An interesting open question is whether all of these results can be extended
to arbitrary formulas of the language L. The main stumbling block in generalizing
our proofs is that, as Example 5 shows, the crucial Semantic Stuttering Lemma1
cannot be extended to arbitrary formulas of L.
These considerations lead to another interesting open problem. Gossip pro-
tocols studied in [1] are parametric in the sense that they are formulated in such
a way that they do not depend on the underlying graph (for instance a ring).
The results we proved allow us only to consider each specific gossip protocol (for
example for a ring formed by 5 agents) separately. What is needed is a deci-
sion procedure that would allow us to consider all instances of a protocol (for
example for all rings) simultaneously. We conjecture that this decision problem
is undecidable both for partial correctness and for termination.
The semantics we introduced in Sect. 3 stipulates through the definition of
c(s) that a call ab is not noted by any agent c = a, b. In [3] different type of calls
were studied, namely
– ab−, which stipulates that every agent c = a, b noted that a called b,
– ab0, which stipulates that every agent c = a, b noted that some call took place,
though not between whom,
– ab+ which stipulates that every agent c = a, b noted that possibly some call
took place, though not between whom.
It would be interesting to check whether our results hold for these types of calls,
as well.
Another issue interesting to study is the synthesis of a distributed epistemic
gossip protocol from epistemic specifications. For a related work on a synthesis
of a knowledge-based programs see, e.g. [12]. Finally, it would be interesting
to study the decidability of the problems considered here for a variant of our
logic in which the only modal operator is the common knowledge operator CGφ.
This operator states that the formula φ is commonly known among the group
of agents G. The standard semantics of this operator is given in [5].
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